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En el caso de las redes emergentes, como la red de radiocomunicaciones 
cognitivas móviles, es esencial estudiar sus posibles ataques y generar así 
estrategias de detección. Por lo general, los ataques se centran en una sola capa 
del modelo OSI, se han estudiado para cada capa desde el nivel físico hasta el 
nivel de aplicación y se han centrado en los usuarios secundarios fijos. En las 
redes de radiocomunicaciones cognitivas, la emulación de usuario primario 
(PUE) es el ataque más estudiado, ya que afecta a todo el ciclo cognitivo desde la 
capa física hasta las capas superiores. En este documento se definen los tipos de 
ataque PUE y las contramedidas, analizando los efectos en los usuarios 





Primary User Emulation, 
Cognitive Radio Network, 
PUE attack, 
security
For emerging networks such as the mobile cognitive radio network, it is 
essential to study their possible attacks and thus generate detection strategies. 
Generally attacks are focused on only one layer of  the OSI model, they have 
been studied for each layer from the physical level to the application level and 
have focused on fixed secondary users. In cognitive radio networks, the 
primary user emulation (PUE) is the most studied attack since it affects the 
entire cognitive cycle from the physical layer to the upper layers. This paper 
defines types of  PUE attack and countermeasures, analyzing the effects on 
fixed and mobile secondary users and attackers.
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https://doi.org/10.14483/issn.2248-4728
1 2 3
ISSN 1909-9746 E-ISSN 2248-4728 Volume 3 number 1- Special edition January – June  2019
160
Ÿ- Perception of  the environment in which he 
works, with spectrum sensing techniques.
Ÿ- Variability and intelligent adaptation of  its 
transmission and reception configuration.
2.1. Mobile Cognitive Radio Network
After the appearance of  the general concept of  
cognitive radio, the IEEE standard 802.22 ,  is  [6] [8]
created, defined as the first worldwide standard based 
on cognitive radio. It seeks to be a standard for wireless 
regional area networks WRAN (wireless regional area 
network), which focuses on fixed point-multipoint 
networks, using the UHF / VHF bands, in a range of  
54MHz-862MHz, although the application of  its 
concept is broader  .
The exclusive attack on the cognitive radio network 
called primary user emulation (PUE), is based on the 
mimic of  a primary user's signal, causing an erroneous 
frequency assignment to the attacker by identifying it as 
a primary user. The approaches to detecting this type of  
attack have been designed for each layer of  the OSI 
model, an approach inherited from the traditional fixed 
network, which does not apply in the same way for 
mobile cognitive networks   . [8], [9]
The attacks to the mobile cognitive networks have 
evolved and the affectation can reach all or several layers 
of  the network . This implies that the detection of  [10]
such attacks must also be multi-layered. Several authors 
have proposed the use of  the cross-layer design for the 
detection of  attacks , but it is still not [6], [11], [12]
validated with a real case, especially for attacks on the 
mobile cognitive radio network such as PUE, since it 
allows obtaining and sharing information between non-
underlying layers of  the network architecture, thus 
optimizing the detection of  the attack  .[6]
In cognitive radio, security is an aspect to be evaluated 
with the convergence of  networks and services in mind, 
since each type of  network has its own security 
requirements  . For example, security and privacy [5]
are required against illegal interceptions, espionage 
techniques or Denial of  Service (DoS) attacks, among 
others  . With the emergence of  this technology and  [6]
the current services, the question arises about what 
attacks can occur in these networks and how to detect 
them. Several authors have highlighted the importance 
of  evaluating these attacks in cognitive radio networks, 
in addition to traditional attacks on any mobile network 
[7].
Cognitive radio is based on intelligent or cognitive 
radio-defined software (SDR). This concept was raised 
by Joseph Mitola in 1999, as part of  his doctoral thesis 
[13],  defining a cognitive radio device as a portion of  
the physical world, with the ability to detect a user's 
communication needs, analyzing the environment and 
the availability of  the system, to use the transmission 
medium required for a connection . The  [13]
characteristics of  a cognitive radio system are :[14]
1.    Introduction
Colombia uses the spectrum management system called 
command and control, where an operator is given a 
specific frequency band, whether used or not. This 
system underutilizes the radioelectric spectrum, which 
is the most important and limited resource in the area of  
telecommunications  For this reason, technological  [1].
alternatives are sought to optimize its use and that's 
why in the last decade, the interest of  the scientific 
community has grown to the study of  mobile cognitive 
radio networks  .[2]
2. Mobile cognitive radio network security threats 
Studies carried out by entities such as the FCC (Federal 
Communications Commission) and results of  [3]
doctoral studies in Colombia   , have shown that a [4]
large part of  the radioelectric spectrum is used 
inefficiently, which offers the possibility of  taking 
advantage of  the spectrum that is not being used for the 
transmission of  data of  other users, optimizing the 
radio spectrum management. This is the basis of  
cognitive radio, sending data from secondary users 
through frequencies that are not being used by primary 
users in a moment of  time  .[4]
Ÿ- Consciousness of  the environment, of  their 
own capacities and of  the available resources.
Ÿ-  Autonomy to act as transmitter or receiver.
2.2. Mobile Cognitive Radio Network
The main purpose of  the mobile cognitive radio 
network is to provide cellular services in an 
independent network without the need of  a license. For 
Ernesto Cadena-Muñoz , Hermes Javier Eslava-Blanco , Ingrid Patricia Páez-Parra
161
this purpose, the cognitive base station senses the 
environment in a specific frequency range, if  a primary 
user (PU) is not using its assigned frequency, it uses to 
communicate with a secondary user (SU).  It can be a 
centralized model, but to improve the performance it 
can be a distributed and cooperative environment  . [6]
An approach to the attacks of  cognitive radio networks 
[15], is described in Figure 1:
2.3.    Security Threats in CRN
The main threats of  the cognitive radio network are 
classified into traditional security threats, which affect 
all wireless networks and the threats that appear for the 
cognitive radio network   , these have different  [7]
subdivisions for the different layers of  the protocol in 
security for the cognitive radio network   . [8] , [9]
In this figure, the Incumbent Emulation (IE), was the 
first approach to the primary user emulation attack 
[8] . 
3.    Primary User Emulation
It is the first and the most investigated attack in the 
cognitive radio network, where the radio transmission 
frequency mimics the primary signal, causing the 
attacker user to be mistakenly identified as a primary 
user assigning the available frequency. The impact on 
the network is high because it causes: bandwidth waste, 
QoS degradation, denial of  service, interference to the 
primary network and an unreliable connection [7], 
[16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], among others.
-      PUE Definition
In a non-cooperative cognitive network, an attack 
against a user will not affect others, since the other 
devices act independently and make their own decisions. 
In a cooperative cognitive network, attacks against a 
subset of  users can have far-reaching effects. For 
example, an IEEE 802.22 implementation would have a 
logic in which all secondary devices are migrated to a 
new free frequency if  a single device detected a primary 
user signal. Thus, an attacker can send a primary user 
signal to a single IEEE 802.22 device and the network 
will migrate all users to a new frequency, allowing 
access to that part of  the free spectrum to the attacker 
[8] .
Techniques such as detection filters, energy detection 
and detection of  cyclo-static characteristics, try to 
provide the ability to distinguish between the primary 
user and the secondary user. In such a hostile 
environment, the definition of  the primary user can be 
extremely difficult. In PUE, and attacker can modify its 
Figure 1. Cognitive Radio Network Security Threats [15]
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 interface so that it emulates the signal of  a primary 
user, in this case, the secondary user observes that the 
signal that is generated is from a primary user and 
cannot transmit on this frequency, which causes a denial 
of  service to said user due to the attack  .[22]
The PUE attack affects not only the physical layer 
of  the OSI model, it also affects the application 
layer [12] and all other layers [23], [24]. In the 
Figure 2 you can see the relationship of  the PUE 
attack with the cognitive radio cycles [24], which 
are related to the layers of  the OSI model:
The attacker can falsify the data collected of  the use 
of  the spectrum in the learning process of  the 
cognitive radio to determine which frequencies to 
try to access in the future, causing that some 
frequencies cannot be used and have total control 
over them [22]
Figure 2  . Cognitive radio cycles [24] 
-     PUE Example
This figure shows the clear division between the 
primary mobile network, consisting of  a base 
station and primary or licensed users connected to 
that station and the mobile cognitive radio 
network, which by definition has a cognitive base 
station and secondary users connected to it [21] .
In the licensed band I, the network has the 
frequencies from f1 to f6 to distribute in its 
network. The frequencies f1, f3 and f4 are being 
used for the transmission of  the primary user 
signals. Therefore, the frequencies f2, f5 and f6 are 
free. The mobile cognitive radio network detects 
that these frequencies are free and assigns them to 
SU1, SU2 and SU3. What the attacker EU2 does, 
by means of  the primary user emulation, is to send 
the signal of  f2, as the primary user, making 
communication between SU1 and SU3 impossible, 
disabling this frequency for its own use. For 
licensed band II, the attack frequencies do not 
impede the communication of  SU4 and SU5, 
because they use other frequencies [21] .
-       PUE classification
Based on the attacker's purpose, PUE attacks can 
be classified in [19]:
Figure 3.  PUE Example  [21]
-        Malicious attack
In PUE malicious attacks, an attacker prevents 
secondary users from detecting and accessing free 
frequency bands. The attacker does not use a band 
of  spectrum for their own communication. The aim 
of  the attacker is to reduce the use of  the band of  
available spectrum [19] .
-        Selfish attack 
The selfish PUE attack is performed by a selfish 
secondary user. In this attack, if  a selfish user 
detects a band of  free spectrum, it prevents other 
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Based on the power level, an attacker can have fixed 
or variable power: a fixed-power attacker uses an 
invariable predefined power level regardless of  the 
actual transmit power of  the primary users and the 
surrounding radio environment. An attacker with 
adaptive power adjusts it's transmit power 
according to the estimated transmission power of  
the primary signal and channel parameters [22] .
secondary users from detecting the spectrum, with 
which the selfish user could gain full access to the 
spectrum. The aim of  the attacker is to maximize 
his own use [19] .
Based on the position, the attacker can be static or 
mobile: a static attacker has a fixed location that 
would not change during all rounds of  attacks. A 
mobile attacker will constantly change its location, 
making it difficult to trace and discover [22] . 
In the following Table, classification is described 
from the point of  view of  purpose, power level, 
position  [23]and general functionality.
With regard to the work carried out for the detection of  PUE, the author in – , classifies detection in the 
following categories:
4. Primary user emulation detection
Figure 4. PUE Detection [25] 
Table 1. PUE classification, adapted from [23].
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Detecting an attacker present is the first step in 
mitigating the PUE attack. This topic is part of  the 
distributed cooperative sensing scheme and the 
detection of  anomalies [4]. It is emphasized that in 
t h e  l i t e r a t u r e ,  t h e  t e r m s  d e t e c t i o n , 
countermeasure, defense or mitigation are used to 
name these detection mechanisms. [1-28]. This 
investigation will clarify these terms. In the work 
of  Rong Yu (2015)[21], clarity is made in the 
difference between detection and counterattack or 
defense. Although several detection techniques 
have been developed, none of  the existing 
approaches can promise accurate detection of  all 
PUE attacks, so system-level mechanisms are 
needed to maintain the overall performance of  the 
network under PUE attacks undetected. The 
author proposes a cross-layer design for the defense 
of  not detected PUE  [21].
In Table 2, some of  the techniques that have been 
worked out for the detection of  primary user 
emulation in cognitive radio networks [25], [26] y 
[27]  are described in Table 2.
In the distributed / individual type based on nodes, 
the application of  techniques in the individual user 
and how to protect a particular user from the attack 
is emphasized; in the centralized / cooperation 
based, the emphasis is on cooperation and 
communication with the central authority to 
discover unusual activities. In the distributed, the 
authority makes decisions with the individual user, 
while in the centralized scheme the decision 
making is with the central authority. The intrusion 
detection system identifies the attacking users in 
general and an activity may be the PUE attack 
[25] .
The author Fragkiadakis (2013) [24] , makes an 
evaluation of  some detection techniques 
developed, within the most important conclusions 
are that if  the detection technique needs to alter the 
information, structure or protocol of  the primary 
user, it does not meet the criteria of  the FCC, as is 
the case of  cryptography techniques. This author 
emphasizes that these techniques have been tested 
in simulator, but not implemented in development 
cards. The simulations were developed for an 
attacker with fixed location and fixed secondary 
users, in addition to having a fixed power so that 
detection can be carried out [24].
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Table 2. PUE Detection Techniques [25], [26] y [27].
One of  the most important attack in mobile cognitive 
radio networks is the Primary user Emulation. This 
attack has been analyzed in the literature for a fixed 
Primary user and a fixed Primary User Attacker, but in 
a mobile network is not often that users are fixed. It's 
necessary to model this attack in a mobile environment, 
observing not just the physical layer, but the 
interactions in a cross-layer design.
5.    Conclusions
According to this table, the limitation of  the different 
types of  detection exposed is that they have been 
developed for an attacker with a fixed position and do 
not apply for all scenarios of  a PUE attack, since it does 
not analyze the scenario with dynamic location [28], 
[15], [25] In addition, some of  these techniques do 
not meet the criteria of  the FCC [24] .
6. Future work
A solution that has been proposed for the detection of  
PUE in the mobile cognitive radio network is the cross-
layer design [11], [6], since it allows obtaining and 
sharing information between non-underlying layers of  
the network architecture, By optimizing security and 
mitigating the effects of  attacks on the network [6] , 
the model can be seen in the following Figure 5.
We express our gratitude to Colciencias and 
The PUE detection techniques in mobile cognitive 
radio networks have the drawback that they have 
been designed with a secondary user whose 
location is fixed, known and a fixed attacker, 
therefore, the secondary user and attacker with 
dynamic location have not been addressed [28], 
[25], [15].
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